ANTANANARIVO – Madagascar, the world’s fourth-largest island, is once again navigating the precarious waters of political transition following the October 2025 military-backed coup. This latest upheaval, which saw the exit of President Andry Rajoelina, was not initiated by a power-hungry general but by a widespread, youth-led public fury over chronic electricity blackouts, water shortages, and entrenched corruption. The intervention by the elite Army Corps of Administrative and Technical Personnel and Services, CAPSAT, was quickly celebrated by many Malagasy who saw the military as a necessary, if unconstitutional, remedy for a failed democratic system. However, for investors and regional partners, the transition under Colonel Michael Randrianirina is viewed with profound caution. The economy, which already sees approximately 75% of the population living in poverty, immediately faces the dual shock of political instability and the withdrawal of regional legitimacy.
The immediate reaction among the Malagasy people is a complicated mix of relief and anxiety. The protests, driven by a so-called Gen Z movement, successfully forced a change after weeks of mass demonstrations against poverty and the cost of living. Colonel Randrianirina, who was sworn in as the new leader, has scored a few key milestones to consolidate power and address public grievances. Crucially, he quickly appointed a civilian prime minister and announced an 18-month to two-year transition period before new elections, a move intended to placate both local opinion and international mediators. Furthermore, the impeachment of the former President by the National Assembly before the military takeover provided a flimsy, yet technically useful, veneer of constitutional propriety for the regime change. However, the suspension of the constitution and the establishment of a Transitional Military Council confirm that political power rests firmly with the military, delaying the democratic aspirations of the youth who sparked the change.
The economic reality is grim. The crisis erupted precisely as the nation was engaged in challenging economic reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund. The IMF, which had previously approved financing under its Extended Credit Facility and Resilience and Sustainability Facility, swiftly revised Madagascar’s 2025 GDP growth projections downwards from 4.6% to 4.0%. This economic beating is compounded by existing challenges, including a US tariff hike on the textile and apparel industry, a major employer, and difficulties in the critical mining sector, which produces graphite, cobalt, and nickel. The World Bank’s consistent assessment is that economic recovery remains uneven and insufficient to reduce the near 75% poverty rate. The coup threatens to derail fiscal consolidation efforts, particularly the politically sensitive reforms designed to end costly subsidies to the state-owned utility JIRAMA. The new government faces the herculean task of simultaneously appeasing a demanding populace with social spending while maintaining the fiscal discipline demanded by international creditors.
The political consequences of the unconstitutional power change were swift and definitive in the regional bodies. The African Union immediately suspended Madagascar, adhering to its zero-tolerance policy for coups. More impactful, however, was the decision regarding the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Despite the former government only recently taking the rotational chairmanship, Madagascar acknowledged its limited capacity amid domestic challenges and formally stepped down from the role. SADC subsequently appointed South Africa as the Interim Chair until the next summit. This withdrawal—whether voluntary or coerced—has a significant impact on the legitimacy of the new government within the SADC region. The SADC’s core principles rely heavily on constitutional order, and the transfer of the chair back to South Africa signifies a clear and categorical regional rejection of the military’s hold on power. It isolates Antananarivo diplomatically, signaling that full political and economic integration within the regional bloc remains conditional on a return to civilian-led, constitutional governance, thereby placing sustained pressure on the new leadership to adhere to its stated transition timeline.
